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COMMENT
WATER LAW-WELL PERMITS-
Unappropriated Water and Maximum Utilization
Hall v. Kuiper, 510 P.2d 329 (Colo. 1973).
INTRODUCTION
In an early Colorado case Justice Helm explained the conse-
quences of the West's scarcityof water:
The climate is dry, and the soil, when moistened only by.the usual
rainfall, is arid and unproductive; except in a-few favored sections,
artificial irrigation for agriculture is an absolute necessity. Water in
the various streams thus acquires a value unknown in moister cli-
mates.'
These conditions made a system for allocating water essential,
and therefore led to the development of the doctrine of prior
appropriation. Simply stated, the doctrine is an application of
the maxim "first in time, first in right," because it gives to an
appropriator whose diversion and beneficial use of water is prior
in time to that of others the right to use that water in the future,
free from interference by subsequent appropriators. Prior appro-
priation was incorporated into the state constitution2 and has
been applied not only to water in "natural streams," but also to
tributary ground water3 and designated ground water4 as well.
Increased development in Colorado has led to an increased
demand for water, a trend expected to continue in the future.5 In
'Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446 (1882).
2 The right to divert the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to
beneficial uses shall never be denied. Priority of appropriation shall give the
better right as between those using the water for the same purpose ....
COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
:'Safranek v. Town of Limon, 123 Colo. 330, 228 P.2d 975 (1951); Nevius v. Smith, 86
Colo. 178, 279 P. 44 (1928); Comstock v. Ramsay, 55 Colo. 244, 133 P. 1107 (1913); CoLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 148-21-2(1), -3(3) (Supp. 1969).
'CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-18-1 (Supp. 1965). Designated ground water is:
ITIhat ground water which in its natural course would not be available to
and required for the fulfillment of decreed surface rights, or ground water in
areas not adjacent to a continuously flowing natural stream wherein ground
water withdrawals have constituted the principal water usage for at least
fifteen years preceding the date of the first hearing on the proposed designa-
tion of the basin; and which in both cases is within the geographic bounda-
ries of a designated ground water basin.
Id. § 148-18-2 (Supp. 1971).
'Harrison & Sandstrom, The Groundwater-Surface Water Conflict and Recent
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the Arkansas Valley, for example, demand for irrigation water is
predicted to double by the year 2000.6 This prediction must be
viewed in the context of the vastly greater use of water for irriga-
tion in Colorado than for all other uses.7 Not surprisingly, surface
water has become scarcer as a result of this increased demand.
This growing scarcity of surface water has had two results.
The first is an increase in the number of wells drilled in recent
years, which in turn has led to conflicts between ground and
surface water users.8 In an attempt to bring some order to the
chaotic state of ground water development, the Colorado General
Assembly passed the Ground Water Management Act,' which
sets up a permit system for wells. The second result of this grow-
ing scarcity has been the articulation of a doctrine of maximum
utilization.
In the recent case of Hall v. Kuiper,'" the Colorado Supreme
Court interpreted the well permit statute and began a new direc-
tion in the development of maximum utilization. This comment
will consider that case in detail, examining its impact on both
these facets of Colorado water law.
I. Hall v. Kuiper
An owner of farm land near Wellington, Colorado, applied to
the State Engineer for permits to construct two tributary ground
water wells, each of which would have been used to irrigate an
80-acre tract. Both wells would have been pumped at a rate of 500
gallons per minute, and the total annual pumped volume would
have amounted to 240 acre-feet. The ground water to be pumped
by the wells was tributary to the Cache la Poudre River, 13 miles
distant, yet the wells would not "substantially affect" any surface
rights or wells in the immediate area."
Colorado Water Legislation, 43 U. COLO. L. REV. 1. 3 (1971) Ihereinafter cited as Harrison
& Sandstroml.
'Id. at 2-3.
7In 1965, 3,900,000 acres were irrigated in Colorado, requiring 13,000,000 acre-feet, or
11,000 million gallons per day (mgd) of water. In the same year, 360 mgd were required
for public supplies and 40 mgd for rural use. THE WATER ENCYCLOPEDIA 226, 228, 230 (D.
Todd ed. 1970).
'See, e.g., Kuiper v. Well Owners Conservation Ass'n, 176 Colo. 119, 490 P.2d 268
(1971); Fellhauer v. People, 167 Colo. 320, 447 P.2d 986 (1968). For a discussion of the
conflicts between ground and surface water users, see Harrison & Sandstrom, supra note
5.
'CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 148-18-1 to -38 (Supp. 1965).




The State Engineer initially denied the applications and,
following a hearing on the matter, he denied them again. The
Halls then purchased the property and continued efforts to obtain
the well permits by taking an appeal in the form of a trial de novo
to the Larimer County District Court, which upheld the State
Engineer's denial. On appeal the Colorado Supreme Court
affirmed."1
For the State Engineer to issue a permit to construct a well
under the Colorado Ground Water Management Act, he must
find that (1) there is unappropriated water available, and that (2)
the proposed well would not cause material injury to the vested
rights of others."3 In addition, these findings must be supportable
by hydrologic and geologic facts. The Cache la Poudre is tributary
to the South Platte River, and both are over-appropriated some
of the time. 4 Further, there was testimony at the trial that the
proposed wells would have caused a steady diminishment in the
amount of ground water reaching the stream, thereby depriving
senior surface appropriators of some of the water to which they
were entitled. On the basis of these facts, the court concluded
that there was support for the findings that no unappropriated
water was available and that the wells would have caused mate-
rial injury to other appropriators. Acknowledging that it would be
difficult for the State Engineer to single out any particular appro-
priator who would be injured by the wells, the court held that he
could nevertheless refuse to issue the well permits without having
to make such specific findings. The court also held that the con-
stitutional guarantee of the right to make an appropriation' was
inapplicable because of the lack of unappropriated water.
As a first step toward appreciating Hall's significance, it is
necessary to analyze the statute giving the State Engineer the
power to grant well permits, and to examine carefully the court's
interpretation of it.
II. WELL PERMITS AND THE GROUND WATER MANAGEMENT ACT
The Colorado Ground Water Management Act of 1965 pro-
vides that no well may be constructed outside a designated
ground water basin 6 without a permit from the State Engineer,"
"Id. at 329.
"COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-18-36(2) (Supp. 1971).
"Hall v. Kuiper, 510 P.2d 329, 330 (Colo. 1973).
SCOLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
"The applications for well permits in Hall were not in a designated ground water
basin.
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and such a permit may be obtained only under the following
circumstances:
If the state engineer shall find that there is unappropriated water
available for withdrawal by the proposed well and that the vested
water rights of others will not be materially injured, and can be
substantiated by hydrological and geological facts, he shall issue a
"permit to construct a well", but not otherwise ....
Significantly, the two major requirements for issuing a well
permit-availability of unappropriated water and lack of mate-
rial injury-are defined nowhere in the statutes. Therefore, the
court's application of the statute in Hall is important because it
puts flesh on the bare bones of the statute.
A. The Court's Interpretation
The court's approach to dealing with the requirement of un-
appropriated water in Hall is clear. After stating that the Poudre
and South Platte Rivers are over-appropriated, the court ex-
plained:
This means that in the irrigation season, except during storm and
flood times, there is not enough water in the streams to satisfy all
of the decreed surface appropriations."
What the court did, then, is to hold that if a river is fully
appropriated at any time of the year, it has no unappropriated
water available within the meaning of section 148-18-36(2). The
rationale for this holding would seem to be that no new user
should be allowed to make an appropriation unless adequate
water is available for him on every day of the year.
The court seems to follow a similar approach in its treatment
of the material injury question. Although admitting that at some
times there is adequate water available for all appropriators, the
court countered with the observation that:
Itihe applicants . ..cannot escape the evidence in the record that




In other words, the fact that there is no unappropriated water
available some of the time leads inexorably to the conclusion that
there will be material injury. Such an approach in effect equates
the two requirements of unappropriated water and no material
'7CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-18-36(1) (Supp. 1965).
"Id. § 148-18-36(2) (Supp. 1971).
'510 P.2d at 330 (emphasis added).
'"Id. at 332.
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injury; the absence of unappropriated water some of the time
makes it impossible to meet the material injury test.
By making these two requirements synonomous, the court
adopted a position Which could result in prohibiting the issuance
of all well permits for new water rights in the future. Colorado's
rivers are all fully appropriated, at least some of the time;2 there-
fore, in the court's view, there would be material injury and no
unappropriated water for new wells, and hence no well permits
could be issued. This result could hardly have been in the con-
templation of the legislature, for it would be absurd to establish
the machinery to issue well permits and at the same time set
requirements such that no permit could ever be issued.
The fact that the court's reasoning leads to this unexpected
result suggests that its interpretation of the statute may be incor-
rect. To explore this possibility, an alternate interpretation of the
statutory requirements for issuing a well permit is suggested.
B. A Proposed Interpretation
It must be noted that the requirement of unappropriated
water was added to the statute in 1971; prior to that time, the
only question was one of material injury. 22 This fact strongly sug-
gests that the General Assembly intended that the new require-
ment deal with something other than material injury. Otherwise,
there would have been no reason for the amendment.
The proposed interpretation of these requirements is based
upon the fact that prior appropriation has two distinct functions,
and it is suggested that each of the two statutory requirements
deals with one of these functions. To be more specific, prior ap-
propriation provides a means by which water rights can be ac-
quired, and it also provides a mechanism for regulating the exer-
cise of rights thus acquired. The availability of unappropriated
water is essential to the acquisition of water rights, and questions
of material injury concern the exercise of these rights.
1. Requirement of Unappropriated Water
The right to make an appropriation is guaranteed by the
Colorado constitution, but only with respect to unappropriated
"IHolland & Hart. Report to Governor ,John A. Love on Certain Colorado Water Law
Problems. Dec. 20, 1972, at 5, 39: C. McGUINNESS, THE ROLE OF GROUND WATER IN THE
NATIONAL WATER SITUATION 214, 216 (Geologic Survey Water-Supply Paper No. 1800.
196:3); Delaney. Water for Oil Shale Development, 43 DENVER L.J. 72, 75 (1966).
:''Coompare CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-18-:16(2) (Supp. 1971) with id. (Supp. 1965).
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water.2" If there is no unappropriated water, there can be no right
to appropriate nor indeed, any water which can lawfully be ap-
propriated. The availability of unappropriated water is thus im-
portant as a threshold question.
Assuming that the existence of unappropriated water is a
prerequisite to obtaining a water right, how is this requirement
to be met? Traditionally, the courts have held that when, on any
given day, the needs of all appropriators on a stream are being
met, any excess water in the stream is considered to be unappro-
priated. 4 This approach takes account of the fact that on a given
day a stream may have more water than needed to fill decreed
priorities, or it may simply be that the stream has more water
than appropriators are taking. Allowances are made for day-to-
day differences in the stream, and simply because a stream is
fully appropriated one day, it may not be so on the following day.
In other words, the existence of unappropriated water on a partic-
ular day depends upon conditions that day. Contrast this with
the approach in Hall, where the fact that a stream was fully
appropriated some of the time dictated that there could be no
unappropriated water any day of the year, regardless of whether
or not there was excess water in the stream that day.
That a stream may be fully appropriated on some days and
yet have unappropriated water on other days was illustrated in
Cache la Poudre Reservoir Co. v. Water Supply & Storage Co.25
There the court pointed out that even though an appropriator
acquires the right to use a given quantity" of water for a particu-
lar period of time, subsequent appropriators can acquire the right
to take that same quantity of water from the stream during a
different period of time. Of course, for the later appropriators to
acquire such rights, the water would have to be unappropriated
when they make their initial diversions. Hence, the extent of
appropriation of a stream at one time should not be determina-
tive for other times.
The court has also recognized, in Humphreys Tunnel &
Mining Co. v. Frank,7 that even if a stream is normally fully
"CoLo. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
"See, e.g., Humphreys Tunnel & Mining Co. v. Frank, 46 Colo. 522, 532, 105 P. 1093,
1096 (1909).
'125 Colo. 161, 53 P. 331 (1898); accord, United States v. Ahtanum Irr. Dist., 330 F.2d
897, 908-09 (9th Cir. 1964).
""Quantity," it should be noted, refers not to volume of water, but rather to rate of
flow. See City of Colo. Springs v. Bender, 148 Colo. 458, 366 P.2d 552 (1961).
146 Colo. 524, 105 P. 1093 (1909).
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appropriated, conditions may sometimes result in unappro-
priated water:
Though other appropriations, to the full capacity of the stream dur-
ing its ordinary flow, were made before plaintiff's rights accrued,
this does not prevent him from building a ditch and diverting and
using its waters whenever his seniors do not need it. Floods often
occur and the natural flow of the stream is thus augmented. No
appropriator uses water all the time. It is well known that many
streams of this state are over-appropriated, yet appropriators whose
rights accrue after the ordinary flow is fully appropriated, have,
nevertheless, acquired valuable rights . .. .
Because Humphreys Tunnel is an older case, one might well
question whether the possibility referred to there of unappro-
priated water appearing at any time is realistic under present day
conditions. " This question may be answered by examining the
number of days in a year with no call on the river. When a senior
appropriator is not receiving sufficient water to fill his decreed
rights, he puts a "call" on the river, thereby preventing upstream
junior appropriators from taking water to which he is entitled.
But, when there is no call, it is a "free river"; anyone can divert
water from it, and by applying it to beneficial use, he can acquire
rights to it in the future.
Table 1 shows the number of days during each of the last 10
years when there was no call on the South Platte River in District
3." This district was chosen as an example because the property
involved in Hall is located there.
"'Id. at 532, 105 P. at 1096.
"lnterestingly enough, in a recent district court opinion holding the Colorado Ground
Water Management Act unconstitutional. Judge Carpenter cited Humphreys Tunnel for
the proposition that there can always be some unappropriated water even on a fully
appropriated stream. Kuiper v. Lundvall, Civil Action No. 20093 (Weld County Dist. Ct.,
decided July 10, 1973).
"This information was obtained from the Summary Sheets of the South Platte River
Call, which may be examined in the State Engineer's office in Denver.
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A glance at Table 1 shows that although during some excep-
tionally dry years, such as 1964, there was little unappropriated
water available, during most years there was considerable water
available. Diversions could have been made an average of 195
days per year over the last 10 years. Even during the irrigation
season, April through September, there was an average of 71 days
with no call on the river in District 3. What this indicates is that
the statement quoted from Humphreys Tunnel is relevant to
present day conditions on the South Platte.
According to the interpretation of section 148-18-36(2)
argued for here, the question of the availability of unappropriated
water is a threshold matter. Water is considered unappropriated
if it is not required by senior appropriators, and the extent of
appropriation on a stream may change from day to day.
2. Requirement of No Material Injury
The existence of unappropriated water is a necessary, but not
sufficient, condition for the issuance of a well permit. Addition-
ally, there must be a finding that there would be no material
injury to vested rights, a requirement, it is suggested, which looks
to administration. The logic of this proposal may be clarified by
considering how prior appropriation regulates the exercise of sur-
face rights. Once a right to water is acquired by appropriating
otherwise unappropriated water, it is regulated to prevent mate-
rial injury to earlier vested rights. That is, when the exercise of a
junior right would deprive a senior appropriator of water to which




The Water Right Determination and Administration Aci of
196911 also suggests that the question of material injury is relevant
to administration. This Act gives the State Engineer and the
Division Engineers authority to order the discontinuance of diver-
sions causing material injury to prior vested rights. 2
In addition, language in Fellhauer v. People13 gives further
support to the proposition that material injury is an aspect of
regulation:
[Wihenever ... the pumping of a junior well materially injures
senior appropriators who are calling generally for more water, there
exists a legitimate and constitutional ground and reason for the
regulation of the well . . .
If material injury does relate to the administration of wells,
should a well permit be issued only if there will be no material
injury, or rather, whenever regulation of the well can eliminate
possible material injury?
The manner in which prior appropriation regulates surface
water rights suggests an answer to this question. Any new surface
right will almost of necessity interfere with prior vested rights at
some time or another, and when this occurs, the holder of the
junior right is not allowed to make a diversion. Note, however,
that the virtual certainty of material injury at some time or an-
other is not the decisive factor. If regulation (i.e., prohibiting the
junior from diverting water when it is required by senior appropri-
ators) can eliminate material injury, the mere possibility of injury
in the absence of regulation does not defeat the junior's right to
appropriate otherwise unappropriated water.
The law concerning change of water rights offers an analogue
helpful in understanding the well permit statute's requirement of
no material injury. Although the holder of a water right may be
allowed to change the type or location of use, such a change will
be allowed only if it will cause no material injury to other vested
:"CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 148-21-1 to -45 (Supp. 1969).
:"Id. § 148-21-35(2) (Supp. 1969). This material injury depends upon such factors as:
the current and prospective volumes of water in and tributary to the
stream from which the diversion is being made; distance and type of stream
bed between the diversion points; the various velocities of this water, both
surface and underground; the probable duration of the available flow; and
the predictable return flow to the affected stream.
Id.
167 Colo. 320, 447 P.2d 986 (1968).
"Id. at 329, 447 P.2d at 991.
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rights. :'- Often, though, a change will result in material injury, as
when the change is from irrigation to municipal use. In such a
case, rights previously exercised only intermittently would hence-
forth be exercised continuously."' When material injury is a possi-
bility, "the courts will impose conditions upon the change of use
and point of' diversion sufficient to protect the rights of other
appropriators.' : 7 Only the impossibility of imposing restrictions
adequate to protect vested rights will cause a court to deny a
change in water right. :"
Thus, the operation of' prior appropriation and the law of
change of' water rights both suggest that the requirement of no
material injury be interpreted as meaning no material injury
which cannot be removed by regulation. This raises the question
of how wells can be regulated to minimize material injury to
surface appropriators. Essentially, there are four methods by
which this can be done.
The first is simply to order the offending well to stop pump-
ing. :" This approach will obviously be more effective when the
well is close to the stream, where the effects of pumping are
quickly noticeable. Because the ground water in Hall traveled
approximately 3/10 mile per year over the 13 miles to the Cache
la Poudre River,"' the effects of pumping would not reach the
stream for many years. And, by the same token, the effect of
shutting off the wells would not reach the stream for many years.
Furthermore, the court in Hall noted that intermittent pumping
would diminish the amount of ground water reaching the stream
by an amount constant throughout the year." Prohibiting pump-
ing by these wells during the irrigation season-or any other pe-
riod, for that matter-would therefore not eliminate material
injury.
0
:'City of Westminster v. Church, 167 Colo. 1, 445 P.2d 52 (1968); Boulder & White
Rock Ditch & Reservoir Co. v. City of Boulder, 157 Colo. 197, 402 P.2d 71 (1965); Farmers
Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 129 Colo. 575, 272 P.2d 629 (1954); City
of Colo. Springs v. Yust, 126 Colo. 289, 249 P.2d 151 (1952); Bates v. Hall, 44 Colo. 360,
98 P. 3 (1908).
:"See, e.g., City of Westminster v. Church, 167 Colo. 1, 445 P.2d 52 (1968).
:7Authorities cited note 34 supra.
":Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 129 Colo. 575, 272 P.2d
629 (1954).
"This was done in Kuiper v. Well Owners Conservation Ass'n, 176 Colo. 119, 490 P.2d
268 (1971).




Another method of dealing with material injury is to prohibit
continuous pumping. When a well pumps, it lowers the level of
ground water in the area near the intake, an effect known as
"draw down." By pumping intermittently, the cone of depression
thus formed can recover, and hence the effect at a distance from
the well is greatly lessened.2 Assuming, as the court in Hall did,
that even with intermittent pumping the Halls' proposed wells
would have caused a constant diminution in the amount of
ground water reaching the stream, 3 the technique of stop-and-go
pumping would probably have been ineffective.
A third method for minimizing material injury to surface
users from a well is bypass pumping. It was mentioned in
Fellhauer v. People:
The possibility has occurred to us that, if the defendant would dis-
charge a certain portion of the well water into the stream and use
the remainder for his land, no material injury to senior users would
result."
Bypass pumping is based upon the fact that the volume of ground
water required to support a surface flow is significantly greater
than the volume of the surface flow itself. For example, if four
acre-feet of ground water are required to support one acre-foot of
surface flow, it would be possible to pump out all five acre-feet. 5
Then, one acre-foot could be given to the surface users, and the
remainder used by the well owner. 6 This practice is limited, how-
ever, by the recharge capacity of the aquifer and by its effect on
adjacent wells.47 If carried to an extreme, bypass pumping could
dry up surface streams and thus cause ecological problems. Used
in moderation, however, it can help to alleviate adverse effects
from wells. Perhaps the Halls could have used this method to
prevent material injury.
A fourth way to minimize the adverse effects of pumping is
through artificial recharge, which replaces ground water pumped
out by the well. Off-season irrigation is one method of doing this.4"
'"Harrison & Sandstrom, supra note 5, at 33.
'1510 P.2d at 330.
"167 Colo. 320, 335, 447 P.2d 986, 993 (1968).
"5As the amount of ground water decreases, the amount of surface water which it can
support decreases, and so some surface water percolates into the ground.
"This example was taken from Harrison & Sandstrom, supra note 5, at 39.
171d.
" Id. at 14-15.
" d. at 41.
1974
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Another technique is to pump water into the ground via injection
wells,' or, less efficiently, to use the well itself as an injection
well)' With all these methods of artificial recharge the water used
to recharge the aquifer must, of course, come from a source other
than the aquifer. As noted earlier, however, it is still possible on
many days to make a surface appropriation from a river as fully
appropriated as the South Platte.5 2 Therefore, the Halls could
conceivably have made a surface appropriation during periods of
low demand, and by using that water to recharge the acquifer
they could have eliminated material injury to surface
appropriators.
The existence of the four techniques discussed above for
eliminating material injury from pumping wells means that even
if' the ground water pumped by the well is not always unappro-
priated, material injury to senior users need not necessarily re-
sult. Thus, the interpretation of section 148-18-36(2) proposed in
this comment does not equate lack of unappropriated water at
some time in the year with material injury.
C. Comparison of the Two Interpretations
The facts in Hall can serve as a concrete example for compar-
ing the court's interpretation of section 148-18-36(2) with the one
offered in this comment. The court there held that because the
river was fully appropriated some of the time, it had no unappro-
priated water, and therefore the proposed wells would have
caused material injury to vested rights. Hence, a well permit
could not be issued. It is important to note that the court used a
single level test in Hall.
Under the proposed interpretation, however, the first step is
to consider the unappropriated water question. In 'Hall there
would have been a finding of "unappropriated water available for
withdrawal."''" Perhaps it would not have been available every
day, but unappropriated water would nevertheless have been
available. The second step is to determine whether the wells
could be regulated to prevent material injury. Assuming the
court's finding was correct that even intermittent pumping would
'"On techniques of artificial recharge, see W. WALTON, GROUNDWATER RESOURCE EVAL-
UATION 168 (1970): R. DE WIEST, GEOHYDROLOGY 147 (1965); Todd, Groundwater, in
HANDBOOK OF APPLIED HYDROLOGY 13-41 to 13-46 (V. Chow ed. 1964).
"'Harrison & Sandstrom, supra note 5, at 41.
See Table 1 and accompanying discussion supra.
""CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-18-36(2) (Supp. 1971).
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cause a decrease in the amount of ground water reaching the
stream at all times, and assuming that bypass pumping and arti-
ficial recharge would be impractical for some reason or other, it
is therefore apparent that the wells would have caused material
injury. Again, no permit could be issued.
The fact that the same result is reached under these facts
does not mean that the two interpretations always lead to identi-
cal results. In Hall the court's shortcut approach yielded the same
result as the proposed interpretation because of the material in-
jury issue. If', however, there had been a practical way of prevent-
ing material injury by the wells in Hall, then the State Engineer
should have granted the permits. The major difficulty with the
court's interpretation is that by making the presence of unappro-
priated water in the stream all year long the sole criterion, it
oversimplifies the two statutory tests. On the other hand, the two
step analysis proposed here keeps the statutory tests separate.
The advantages of the proposed interpretation over that
employed by the court in Hall can be summarized as follows:
1. It defines unappropriated water in a manner consis-
tent with prior case law.
2. It recognizes that the well permit statute involves
two requirements rather than one.
3. Because it does not automatically equate lack of
unappropriated water with material injury, the pro-
posed interpretation takes into account the possibility
that regulation of wells may remove any material injury
to vested rights.
4. As a further consequence of not equating the two
requirements, and by defining unappropriated water in
the traditional manner, it does not automatically fore-
close the possibility of obtaining a well permit for a new
water right.
For these reasons, the proposed interpretation of section 148-
18-36(2) appears to be superior to that adopted by the court in
Hall. Having established this, it is still possible to gain additional
insight into the meaning of Hall by approaching it from a differ-
ent direction-by examining its impact on maximum utilization.
III. MAXIMUM UTILIZATION
Although always implicitly a part of Colorado water law, the
doctrine of maximum utilization has gained explicit recognition
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only in recent years. No precise definition of the doctrine has yet
been formulated, nor have all.its implications been explored. A
brief review of the development of maximum utilization will aid
in attempting to define its elements.
A. Development of the Doctrine
The prohibition against wasting water has long been a means
of insuring that water be used efficiently. An appropriator other-
wise entitled to water may not divert it if he will not be able to
apply it to beneficial use; he must leave it in the stream for others
to use beneficially. 54 If he has already diverted the water, he must
return to the stream what he cannot use beneficially.5 5 The ob-
vious result of these rules is to allocate water on the basis of
priority of right and upon need, thus rendering water usage more
efficient.
City of Colorado Springs v. Bender6 has been cited as mark-
ing the beginning of the "new era" in maximum utilization. 7
There a senior appropriator sought to enjoin Colorado Springs
from pumping ground water because the city's withdrawals de-
prived him of water. This occurred because the draw down from
the city's well lowered the ground water level below the intake of
the plaintiff's well, which did not reach to so great a depth as the
city's due to irregularities in the aquifer. The court held that an
appropriator must employ an efficient means of making a diver-
sion, and that he is "not entitled to command the whole or a
substantial flow of the stream merely to facilitate his taking the
fraction to which he is entitled."" The court reasoned that since
the plaintiff's well did not reach to a depth great enough for both
himself and the city to pump water from the aquifer, his means
of diversion was inefficient, and hence he could not prevent the
city from withdrawing water. 9
In dictum the court in Bender also discussed the futile call
doctrine. Generally, when a senior appropriator is not receiving
sufficient water to fill his adjudicated priority, he may "call" the
river to prevent appropriators junior to himself from making di-
"Enlarged Southside Irrigation Ditch Co. v. John's Flood Ditch Co., 120 Colo. 423,
210 P.2d 982 (1949); Fort Lyon Canal Co. v. Chew, 33 Colo. 392, 81 P. 37 (1905).
"5Pulaski Irrigation Ditch Co. v. City of Trinidad, 70 Colo. 565, 203 P. 681 (1922).
11148 Colo. 458, 366 P.2d 552 (1961).
"Fellhauer v. People, 167 Colo. 320, 336, 447 P.2d 986, 994 (1968).
"148 Colo. at 462, 366 P.2d at 555, citing Schodde v. Twin Falls Land & Water Co.,
224 U.S. 107 (1912).
"1148 Colo. at 462, 366 P.2d at 555.
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versions. However, the senior is not permitted to make a call
which is futile; that is, if shutting off a particular junior appropri-
ator will not increase the amount of water reaching the senior, the
junior may not be shut off.
Bender thus furthered the development of maximum utiliza-
tion in two ways: first, it refused to encourage inefficient means
of diversion; and second, by forbidding futile calls it helped to
increase the number of users who could make appropriations.
Although Bender and the early decisions against waste sug-
gest a predisposition of the court to favor the more efficient use
of water, the doctrine of maximum utilization was not consciously
articulated until Fellhauer v. People."' In 1969 the Division Engi-
neer attempted to shut down 39 of the more than 1600 major wells
in the Arkansas Valley without prior written regulations or, as far
as the court could discover, without standards of any sort. The
court held that this action was so arbitrary that it violated the
equal protection clause of the United States Constitution and the
due process clause of the Colorado constitution."
In addition, the court discussed maximum utilization. After
quoting from the provisions in the Colorado constitution relating
to prior appropriation, 2 the court concluded:
It is implicit in these constitutional provisions that, along with
vested rights, there shall be maximum utilization of the water of this
state. As administration of water approaches its second century the
curtain is opening upon the new drama of maximum utilization and
how constitutionally that doctrine can be integrated into the law of
vested rights. "
The court did not explain what it meant by maximum utilization
beyond pointing to the decisions forbidding waste and the state-
ment in Bender regarding the need for an efficient means of
diversion.
Following the decision in Fellhauer, the Colorado General
Assembly passed the Water Right Determination and Adminis-
tration Act of 1969, which recognizes the need for maximum utili-
zation. The Act declares that:
it shall be the policy of this state to integrate the appropriation,
use and administration of underground water tributary to a stream
6"167 Colo. 320, 447 P.2d 986 (1968).
"'ld. at 334, 447 P.2d at 993.
"CoLo. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
167 Colo. at 336, 447 P.2d at 994.
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with the use of surface water, in such a way as to maximize the
beneficial use of all of the waters of this state."1
The Act prohibits futile calls"' and requires that an appropriator
establish a reasQnable means of diversion.6 In addition, the state-
ment of policy declares that ground water has thus far received
insufficient attention and that the integration of ground and sur-
face water is vital.
6 7
The next mention of maximum utilization appeared in
Kuiper v. Well Owners Conservation Association,'6  where the
court quoted from Fellhauer and from the Water Right Determi-
nation and Administration Act of 1969. The court viewed that
legislation as an attempt to promote in detail the general thought
in Fellhauer. '9
It might be useful at this point to summarize the preceding
discussion of the development of maximum utilization by listing
the elements of the doctrine which have been hammered out by
the Colorado Supreme Court and the legislature:
1. No wasteful use of water.
70
2. No futile calls.
3. Need for an efficient means of diversion.
72
4. Development of ground water and its coordination
with surface water.
7 3
Underlying these rules is the policy of increasing the effi-
ciency of water use and thus making water available to more
people.
B. The Hall Decision and Maximum Utilization
Prior to Hall the development of a doctrine of maximum
"CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-2(1) (Supp. 1969).
5Id. §§ 148-21-2(e), -35(2) (Supp. 1969).
"Id. § 148-21-2(c) (Supp. 1969).
9
7Id. § 148-21-2(2)(a) (Supp. 1969).
"176 Colo. 119, 490 P.2d 268 (1971).
"Id. at 149-50, 490 P.2d at 283.
7'Enlarged Southside Irrigation Ditch Co. v. John's Flood Ditch Co., 120 Colo. 423,
210 P.2d 982 (1949); Pulaski Irrigation Ditch Co. v. City of Trinidad, 70 Colo. 565, 203 P.
681 (1922); Fort Lyon Canal Co. v. Chew, 33 Colo. 392, 81 P. 37 (1905); see COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 148-7-7 to -9 (1963); Id. at § 148-21-35(2) (Supp. 1969).
"City of Colo. Springs v. Bender, 148 Colo. 458, 366 P.2d 552 (1961); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 148-21-2(e), -35(2) (Supp. 1969).
"City of Colo. Springs v. Bender, 148 Colo. 458, 366 P.2d 552 (1961); CoLo. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 148-21-2(c) (Supp. 1969).
"CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 148-21-2(1), -2(2)(a) (Supp. 1969); Hall v. Kuiper, 510
P.2d 329, 332 (Colo. 1973).
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utilization, although somewhat tentative and uncertain, seemed
to hold the promise of bringing a new era in which Colorado's
water would be used with greater efficiency. However, in Hall
there appears to be an attempt to limit the further development
and application of maximum utilization. For example, the court
stated:
It was in the spirit of Feltlhauer, supra, to add weight to what was
referred to as the "new drama of maximum utilization," viz., among
other things, to use as much underground water as possible. We
dream and we hope that in some future day technology will provide
a means where by [sicl persons in the position of these applicants
can use some water which would represent that reaching the stream
during flood and storm stages. But today these are merely dreams."
Believing, as the court did, that the wells applied for would cause
material injury to vested rights, the court refused with reluctance
to weigh maximum utilization with the other factors used to
reach a decision. Seemingly the court chose not to explore "how
constitutionally that doctrine [maximum utilization] can be in-
tegrated into the law of vested rights. '7" It is not clear whether
the court has declined to further maximum utilization in general
or merely under the facts in Hall. But one thing is certain: the
court's treatment of maximum utilization in Hall will probably
stunt the doctrine's future growth.
CONCLUSION
The drive to make water available to as many people as
possible who can put it to beneficial use is the common factor in
the decisions dealing with maximum utilization. This drive is
also present in the court's pre-Hall definition of what constitutes
unappropriated water, for the day-to-day approach in determin-
ing the existence of unappropriated water would allow a greater
number of appropriators to share in Colorado's water than the all-
or-nothing approach followed in Hall.
Thus, when the court redefined the requirement of unappro-
priated water in Hall, it also implicitly rejected one aspect of
maximum utilization. This suggests that perhaps maximum uti-
lization is much more basic to Colorado water law than had been
previously suspected. Both the prior appropriation and maxi-
mum utilization doctrines derive from the scarcity of water. The
first appeared to allocate water, and the second to insure that it
1'510 P.2d at 332.
7'People v. Fellhauer, 167 Colo. 320, 336, 447 P.2d 986, 994 (1968).
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be used efficiently. Hall v. Kuiper is thus significant because it
gives insight into how the court interprets the well permit statute
and how the court views maximum utilization; and perhaps even
more importantly, it illustrates how basic maximum utilization
is to Colorado water law.
Thomas F. Cope
